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Available online 11 August 2016Based on Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action, this paper critiques the transparency and legitimacy of
participatory scenario planning, considering a case study of scenario development for the livestock industry
within Scotland. The paper considers the extent to which the case study approximates the conditions for ‘ideal
speech situations’ and how these conditions could be applied more widely in participatory scenario planning.
The authors explore the rationale for participatory scenario planning within the science–policy interface with
critical reference to the corporate context in which scenario planning has evolved. The aim is to optimise the
potential for its use in the context of socio-technical and environmental governance. Researcher co-reﬂections
on the case study are mapped within a matrix of indices representing conditions for ideal speech situations.
Further analytical categories highlight the extent to which ideal speech was approximated. Although many of the
constraints on achieving ideal speech situations reﬂect intransigent, practical logistics of organising participatory
exercises, our novel approach enables the systematic identiﬁcation of some important issues and provides a concep-
tual framework for understanding how they interrelate that may prove useful to practitioners and theorists alike.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Keywords:
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Habermas1. Introduction
The history of scenario planning coincides with a prominent shift in
governance approaches in western democracies. This shift has been
attributed to a crisis of legitimation surrounding public decision-making
institutions in which the role of traditional knowledge bases is eroding
(Enticott and Franklin, 2009; Hajer, 2003). It is evidenced through the
way democratic governments increasingly seek legitimation for their
policies by commissioning participatory exercises including scenario
planning (for example, Eames and Egmose, 2011). This is particularly
evident in relation to policy around science, technology and environ-
mental management (Attar and Genus, 2014; Wachinger et al., 2014).
Participatory processes and the values behind them are championed
by critics of technocratic approaches (Irwin and Wynne, 1996;
Wynne, 1975, 2008). The participatory research paradigm embraces
local knowledges and promotes bottom-up ownership of data generationgraphical Sciences Group, The
Q, Scotland, UK.
uckett).
. This is an open access article underand analysis in opposition to traditional, institutional power centres
(Holland, 2013).
Scenario planning is widely used in participatory exercises and
researchers are often involved in the design and facilitation of stake-
holder workshops (Patel et al., 2007). At the science–policy interface,
where signiﬁcant deployment of this method is currently taking
place (Government Ofﬁce for Science, 2013), its application potentially
intersects with a wider set of democratic values. In order to realize its
potential in the public sphere however, it is argued that, a participatory
engagement needs to respect key normative criteria, including repre-
sentativeness and transparency, to underpin legitimacy (Horlick-Jones
et al., 2007; Rowe and Frewer, 2000). In practice many processes lack
optimal representativeness (Reed et al., 2013), but so long as their com-
position is transparent the public can at least draw inferences about
whose interests are being represented. However, critics maintain that
orthodoxies, institutional power bases and established orders continu-
ally attempt to reassert and reinvent themselves by undermining genu-
ine participation often under the guise of allegedly scientiﬁc modes of
thought (Stirling, 2006, 2008; Wynne, 1975, 2008). Furthermore, the
status quo across Europe remains decidedly non-participatory, leaving
the framing of most science and technology deliberations in the handsthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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use approaches with technocratic overtones (Chilvers, 2008).
The emergence of scenario planning within the context of science,
technology and environmental management follows decades of
development as a corporate strategy development tool. However,
expectations from participatory exercises undertaken by researchers
to informpolicy extend beyond those associatedwith scenario planning
in the corporate world (Bishop et al., 2007; Flowers, 2003). At the
science–policy interface the researcher is not solely intent upon devel-
oping a corporate strategy, which may stand or fall upon its utility as
determined by institutional decision-makers. Rather, scenario planning
is being used to feed into government policy as part ofwider democratic
decision-making processes. Initiatives like Foresight (the UK Govern-
ment Centre for Horizon Scanning), for example, exist to explore policy
options through projects either directly or indirectly commissioned by
governments and their agencies to “provide strategic options for policy”
(Government Ofﬁce for Science, 2013; see also Foresight, 2008, 2010,
2011). This is not to say that scenario planning for policy makers is nec-
essarily always participatory, nor that valid contexts donot exist for sce-
nario planning outside the public sphere. However, this paper concerns
participatory scenario planning exercises in the public sphere, particu-
larly those that aim to address socio technical and environmental con-
cerns of which there are many (for example Foresight, 2013). In this
context researchers are placed under a special obligation to reﬂect on
the legitimacy of the recommendations or evidence obtained through
themethods that are used. Twoparticular areas thatwe address are:ﬁrst-
ly, problems regarding representativeness (Horlick-Jones et al., 2007;
Irwin, 2006; Blackstock et al., 2015) including unavoidable participant
biases (O'Brien, 2004) and power relations (Attar and Genus, 2014);
and secondly, issues relating to the tools, methods and practices that
inﬂuence the creation of the messages emanating from the process
that need to be critically examined (Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Latour
and Woolgar, 1979; Chilvers, 2008) rather than creating a black box
and masking prevailing orthodoxies under the guise of scientiﬁc neu-
trality (Wynne, 1975). This ‘special obligation’ is an underlying assump-
tion in this research, which is founded in the democratic ethos of
Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action (1984a,b).
The scenario planning literature reveals that a variety of techniques
have entered into use within the science–policy interface (Bishop et al.,
2007) and highlights a wide range of limitations of the scenario planning
approach (e.g. O'Brien, 2004; Wright et al., 2009). We focus on those
concerning the legitimacy of scenario planning methods related to their
use in participatory processes in the public sphere. We recognise that
considerable challenges exist elsewhere, for example regarding relevance
and creativity (see also Alcamo et al., 2006); however, we explore how
scenario planning can act as a policy-enabling participatory process by
identifying some of the issues that potentially erode its legitimacy, and
by taking a critical look at the concerns raised by Rounsevell and
Metzger (2010) regarding deﬁciencies in its robustness. We argue that
there are distinct issues surrounding participatory democracy where
scenario planning is deployed in a societal governance context that
demand greater scrutiny than is necessarily required in the corporate
sphere where much of the methodology has been developed. In
Section 2.2 the paper considers the nature of the differences between
these two contexts and a case is made for a re-appraisal of aspects of
the praxis of participatory scenario planning in the public sphere.
The remaining sections draw on the authors' experiences of a series
of scenario planning exercises involving stakeholder workshops. The
motivation for this paper stems from critical reﬂection of these expe-
riences and a ﬁrm belief that methodological improvements can be
attained in regard to the legitimacy of such processes by drawing
on existing theory in the ﬁeld of discourse ethics, namely work of
the philosopher Habermas. The case study considers the future manage-
ment of livestock disease in Scotland andwas conductedwithin a Scottish
Government funded research programme. Drawing on a critical reading
of Habermas (1984a,b), and in particular his concept of ‘ideal speechsituations’ (see Section 3), general principles for increasing the trans-
parency and legitimacy of participatory scenario planning processes are
explored.
2. The uses of scenario planning
2.1. Scenario planning: the development of an approach to futures thinking
Following Foucault (Foucault, 1972; Foucault and Senellart, 2008)
we approach scenario planning as a process that has been uniquely
shaped by the particularities of its development. The provenance of sce-
nario planning will be considered in this section after brief introductory
remarks. At itsmost basic level the rationale behind scenario planning is
that imagined, potential and possible worlds can help people or organi-
zations to deal with the inherent uncertainty of the future (Börjeson
et al., 2006). Via multiple re-imaginings of the world as it might be,
the scenario planner hopes to inﬂuence current behaviour to act in the
interests of a better future, or at least improve preparedness for imagin-
able adverse eventualities. Based on this general conception, it is clear
that some form of scenario approach has long existed in society.
Creativeminds, fromHieronymus Bosch (c. 1450–1516),whose paintings
are widely interpreted as didactic templates, toWilliamGibson, author of
the novel Neuromancer (1984), have long used imaginaries to inﬂuence
the socio-political landscape. However, as a formal researchmethod, sce-
nario planning emerged in the 1960′s as a tool to support government
planning. An inﬂuential early futurist, Gaston Berger, founded a school
dedicated to the study of possible futures (Godet and Roubelat, 1996).
The rationale of his method is to allow future possibilities to be investi-
gated in a systematicmanner, thus “clarifying present action in the light
of possible and desirable futures” (Durance and Godet, 2010: 1488).
Berger's scenarios, and those developed in the case study below, are
not primarily about the likelihood of what will happen in the future,
but instead provide the opportunity to evaluate a range of different
possible futures, through a combination of “unfettered creativity
with a methodological prospective approach” (De Brabandere and
Iny, 2010: 1508).
More recently, a distinct context for scenario planning has ﬂourished
around socio-technical change andmanagement of environmental issues
in the public sphere (cf. Robinson et al., 2011; Zurek and Henrichs, 2007;
Eames and Egmose, 2011). As mentioned, scenario planning began as an
instrument developed to support public policy, but the processes we see
in evidence today have been signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by two key develop-
ments: ﬁrstly by the expansion of the approach in the corporate world
where it has not required the same emphasis on democratic principles;
and secondly the shift in public policy development away from the
top-down supremacy of experts, preeminent in the era of Berger,
towards at least the aspiration of a more citizen-centric world of
policy generation evident today. However, this latter shift has not
overturned the dominant culture, nor has it necessarily been matched
by a corresponding epistemological orientation of policy makers or
scientists (Wynne, 1975) who, in many instances continue to privilege
expert knowledge, serving to undermine more democratic attempts to
inﬂuence policy. Given the tendency that the dominant culture has to
reinvent itself as it confronts pressure for reform manifest in new
forms of engagement (Wynne, 2002), there is an added incentive to
be critical of approaches claiming to advance democracy through
more participatory governance.
2.2. Corporate planning contexts versus public policy contexts
Concerns about the democratic credentials of participatory scenario
planning were not central to early scenario planners (see Kahn, 1962;
Rounsevell and Metzger, 2010), who sought to inﬂuence policy in an
epoch characterised by greater top-down governance and less public
engagement than the more bottom-up forms (Bevir, 2007) that have
arguably gained ground more recently. What followed these early
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to an appropriation of a public policy tool by the corporate world where
the requirements for democratic checks and balances have always been
more peripheral drivers of themethodology. A glance at one of the pop-
ular scenario planning guides aimed at business users will conﬁrm that
the pressing problems concern, for example, future proﬁts, increasing
market share, positioning new products, identifying talent and effec-
tively utilizing resources (Wade, 2012). Future-prooﬁng against market
shocks has also been seen as a potential beneﬁt of scenario planning,
and inﬂuenced by this emergent trendmany corporations have adopted
the method (Huss and Honton, 1987; Durance and Godet, 2010;
Ringland, 2006; Rounsevell andMetzger, 2010). By 1981, 75% of Fortune
100 companies reported using some form of scenario planning
(Linneman and Klein, 1983). Variations proliferated including; Two
Axes method, Branch Analysis method, Cone of Plausibility method,
Cause & Effect Scenario Generation, Force Field Analysis, Backcasting,
Morphological Analysis, and Field Anomaly Relaxation (Foresight,
2009). The range and variety is considerable and it falls outside the
scope of the current paper to differentiate between them beyond
commenting that many approaches lend themselves to participatory
exercises with stakeholders. A notable exception, not involving the
sort of stakeholder participation reﬂected uponhere, is quantitative sce-
nario planning (for example Thomas, 2012) which is typically founded
on probabilistic or other mathematical models.
In more recent decades, notably since the 1990s and in the sphere
of socio-technical and environmental governance, scenario planning
has again become a signiﬁcant policy instrument for governments
(Rounsevell and Metzger, 2010). It has, in a sense, come ‘full circle’
in that it has been re-appropriated from its strategic, corporate manage-
ment context by governments, their agencies and related research institu-
tions, to be incorporated in a wide variety of projects at all scales: for
example from the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Carpenter, 2005)
to the Scottish Land Use Strategy regional pilot project (Aberdeenshire
Council, 2014). However, while corporate decision- makers may be satis-
ﬁed to know that strategies emerging from scenario planning exercises
have potential business utility and comply with corporate governance
requirements, the researcher engaged in work directed towards public
policy may have a wider interest in the legitimacy of ﬁndings presented
as originating from participatory stakeholder processes. It is not generally
sufﬁcient, critics argue, for recommendations or strategic guidance
feeding into public policy to originate from a black box (Godet and
Roubelat, 1996). Policy makers need to be conﬁdent that bias is explicit
(Rounsevell and Metzger, 2010) and more widely, following Wynne
(2008) and Stirling (2008), that any constraints thatmay have inﬂuenced
the generation of the ‘evidence’ have been recognised and accounted for
by the researchers. Policy-facing research, especially when it is explicitly
aiming to be participatory, needs to be measured by a different standard
than corporate research, particularly when the research has been
publicly funded, and where it may feed into democratic decision-
making processes.
In response to these concerns, signiﬁcant critical reﬂection has been
directed towards scenario planning with much of it aiming to improve
practice and help researchers achieve outcomes with improved levels
of scientiﬁc credibility. Critics have questioned the predictive power of
scenarios (for example Wright et al., 2009). Other criticisms point to
positivistic assumptions within scenario planning, and have proposed
alternative theoretical perspectives (Chermack and Van Der Merwe,
2003). Wider questions have also been raised about the credibility and
legitimacy of scenario planning at the science–policy interface, where
socio-technical and environmental decision-making occurs (Clark
et al., 2002). Notably, one issue that has been recognised is that the
scenario planning process is necessarily constrained by the worldviews
of the participants whose values and life experiences are an uncontrol-
lable precondition of the engagement that can only be acknowledged
(O'Brien, 2004). Related to this is a concern that information obtained
from elements commonly used in scenario planning, for example,PEST (Political, Environmental, Social and Technological) analysis may
produce uncontested knowledge claims, subject to:
“an assumedveracity of obtainedknowledge… [lacking evaluationof]
potential vested interests involved, i.e. little or no consideration of
how ‘knowledge’ is socially constructed according to the knowledge-
originator's beliefs, values and rationalities.” (Wright et al., 2009: 325).
Materials derived from the process, for example, in the formof recom-
mendations to policy makers, can therefore become decontextualized,
with the intermediary steps leading to their production being forgotten
(see also Latour and Woolgar, 1986). It is against the backdrop of such
fundamental issues concerning the legitimacy of participatory scenario
planning that this paper introduces novel thinking based on the Theory
of Communicative Action (Habermas, 1984a, 1984b).3. Communicative action: a theoretical perspective
Communicative Action, in general terms, is a framework for under-
standing and improving society that seeks to identify and remove un-
necessary constraints that stem from the structure of social life
(Phillips, 1994). The scenario planning context is relatively unexplored
through a Habermasian lens, however, there are a number of studies
that have linked Habermas more generally with participatory planning,
for example, Healey (2006); Allmendinger (2009); Taylor (2010), and
Fast (2013). Working in the spatial planning and environmental gover-
nance contexts, these authors have recognised the potential of ‘ideal
speech situations’ developed in The Theory of Communicative Action
(Habermas, 1984a,b) to resolve some of the methodological challenges
with participatory planning. Healey and colleagues advocate a change in
governance ‘culture’ necessary to improve the management of co-
existence in ‘shared spaces’ through enhanced deliberative, collabora-
tive and inclusionary planning processes (Healey, 2006: 297; Hajer
and Wagenaar, 2003; Healey et al., 2003). Both Allmendinger and
Healey have incorporated elements of the Theory of Communicative Ac-
tion (1984a,b) into the development of spatial planning principles.
Other notable applications of the Theory have judged it to be a useful
basis for incorporating normative considerations derived through
stakeholder or citizen engagement into policy and planning processes
(see also Dietz, 1995 (in Renn et al., 1995); Dietz and Pfund 1988;
Stern et al., 1992). Building on this work, this paper considers the
ideal speech situation as a conceptual tool to explore the legitimacy of
participatory scenario planning in the public sphere where the need is
most acute and where the focus of Habermas' critique is centred.
Habermas (1984b) argues that democratic decision making can
only be regarded as legitimate provided it issues from a process of
public deliberation. All political legitimacy, for Habermas, stems
from communicative power, which is in turn generated by public
discourse (Olson, 2011). The organization and execution of that pub-
lic process are predicated upon reason. Reasonableness can only be
presumed when certain generalizable conditions (which we will
introduce shortly) are met. Habermas' ideas concerning legitimation
for the democratic state are founded, following Durkheim, on the
idea of a common will or consensus that can be communicatively
shaped in the public sphere. The more deliberation, critical spirit, and
reﬂection that are attained in this shaping of public affairs, the more
democratic the state becomes. For the state to legitimately govern it
must seek to determine which representations hold good for the
collectivity. In other words, outcomes from communicative processes
must be held to be sufﬁciently representative in order to be founded
on a common will which in turn ensures legitimacy across society.
Furthermore the high degree of consciousness and reﬂection required
by the state, if it is to be democratic, requires it to minimize prejudices
that evade detection through the transparency of the arrangements it
instigates for the discursive formation of a common will (Habermas,
1984b, p.81).
Table 1
Indices of ideal speech, after Habermas (1984a).
Summary ‘ideal speech’
indices Description
(1) Domination-free • Equal voices — the same chance to speak is
afforded to all;
• Authority based on ‘good argument’ not hierar-
chy — devoid of coercion;
• Allows for criticism and reply.
(2) Free from
strategizing
• Participation with intention to convince universal
audience and/or gain general assent;
• Rationally motivated agreements end disputes;
• Implicit knowledge is theoretically explicit (‘all
cards on the table’);
• Universality: principles transcend speciﬁc loca-
tions and situations.
(3) Deception-free • Absence of self-deception and absence of deception
through participation;
• Trust implicit through assumption of consensus.
(4) Egalitarian • Power relations between participants play no role
in the situation, and only speakers with an equal
chance to employ representative and regulative
speech acts are allowed in the discourse.
(5) Promotes intersub-
jective validity
claims
• Encourages a ‘hypothetical orientation’ and the
shared airing of hypotheses lends itself to inter-
subjective recognition of claims (i.e. exchange and
acceptance of diverse viewpoints).
(6) Recognises different
kinds of evidence
• An open, respectful environment allows a variety of
knowledge claims, different grounds or ways of
backing claims to be brought to the table including
anecdotal evidence.
(7) Constraint-free • No limits on participation (i.e. in terms of numbers,
knowledge types, etc.);
• No force (or exertion of power), except the force
of better argument;
• Better arguments to stand, nothing ruled-out or
ruled-in.
(8) Inclusive • Includes all those who are affected by its decisions.
Anyone who considers his/herself to be potentially
affected by the results of the discourse must have
an equal opportunity to participate.
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democratic processes ﬂourish through forms of participatory engage-
ment for the free and fair governance of society. The basic proposition
is that democratic politics involves people determining the rules by
which they will live together and that these rules are established
through political argumentation. Given that argumentation is an
inherently communicative practice and that language implicitly
commits speakers to cooperate through its very structure (Weber,
1904), Habermas bases his entire democratic theory on discourse
(Olson, 2011). Habermas argues that social coordination (or ‘repro-
duction’) and the halting of disruptive social pathologies stem from
communication oriented towards mutual understanding between
actors (Habermas, 1984b; Fast, 2013). He develops a conceptual
framework to reclaim the project of enlightenment, with its values
of truth, critique and rational consensus that have been labelled
transcendental pragmatics, after its opposition to other forms of
pragmatics that propose relativistic notions of truth (Honderich,
1995). The approach is deemed transcendental because of its faith
in the universality of validity claims that are derived through principles
that go over and above speciﬁc locations and situations (Fast, 2013;
Harvey Brown and Goodman, 2001).
At the core of Habermas' value system is the notion of a regulative
‘ideal speech’ situation that allows human emancipationwithin a public
spherewhere citizens can engage in reasoned debate free from coercion
(Honderich, 1995). He supports this construct with an analysis of
discourse focusing on the core components of the pragmatic, reasoned
argument. Habermas proceeds by conceiving of ideal conditions under
which contested validity claims can be supported by good reasons that
can in turn be criticized, leading to mutual understanding (Habermas,
1984a). It is important to note, however, that Habermas explicitly
recognises that his ideal conditions can only be approximated in the
‘real’world, and that the utility of his conceptual guide to emancipatory
argumentation, lies in pragmatically attempting approximation. Speakers
in actual deliberations may be disappointed that the regulative ideal is
generally unattainable, but Habermas interprets this disappointment as
conﬁrmation that we have presupposed the conditions of legitimacy
(Yates, 2011); this presupposition is a central condition in his overall
argument.
Mutual understanding (and ‘Communicative Action’) is therefore
made possible, according to Habermas, through the approximation of
an ‘ideal speech situation’ which entails a number of important condi-
tions: All parties have access to the same informationwith the implication
that relevant implicit knowledge is (in theory) explicit (Harvey Brown
and Goodman, 2001: 206); no relevant argument is excluded or ignored;
and participants' views are based on the rationality of the argument rath-
er than the instrumental steeringmechanisms of ‘status,money or power’
(Habermas, 1976; Harvey Brown and Goodman, 2001). The ideal speech
situation is a space inwhich citizens have the opportunity to freely partic-
ipate in democratic decision-making (Harvey Brown and Goodman,
2001; Allmendinger, 2009). Ideal speech, in Habermas' overall schema,
underpins communicative action. Strategic action, in contrast, involves
the failure of ideal speech whereby interests undermine legitimate
argumentation.
Wynne (1975) emphasizes the potential for Habermas' approach to
help guard against illegitimate distortions produced by the frameworks
of data collection and analysis that subvert genuine public participation
and uphold powerful orthodoxies. The potential for subversion is wide-
ranging and the relevance of Habermas' work to the critical consideration
of frameworks of data collection and analysis used in participatory
processes transcends any speciﬁc point in the policy cycle. Whether the
participation is constituted in the decision-making phase or earlier in
the agenda-setting stages, Habermas' approach aims at the general level
of reaching discursive understanding, is concernedwith the ‘rightfulness’
of reasons, and promotes developing cooperative approaches between
actors based on reason (Habermas, 1984a: 25). While Habermas' prag-
matic approach allows that constraints cannot necessarily be removed,one of the challenges that this paper takes up is to make them more
explicit using ideal speech to highlight the barriers.
4. Methods
4.1. Theoretical framework development
To illustrate the challenges of achieving objective validity within
participatory scenario planning processes, we use The Theory of
Communicative Action (Habermas, 1984a,b) to reﬂect on a particular
case study of scenario planning in a socio-technical context. Our post-
hoc reﬂection of the scenario planning exercise was guided by indices
drawn from our reading of Habermas' original text through which we
identiﬁed relevant factors associated with the ‘ideal speech situation’.
Care was taken to respect the principle of transcendental pragmatics
whereby our indices would be generalizable. These factors are presented
(in Table 1) as a set of criteria or indices that we used to interpret obsta-
cles to ideal speechwhich appeared to bepresent in our scenario planning
exercise and indeed in other scenario planning experiences that the
authors have participated in. We proceeded by systematically evaluating
individual elements or activities that comprised the case study scenario
planning exercise against the indices. These activities are chronologically
arranged in a matrix (Table 2) and a brief comment is given about the
approximation to an ideal speech situation (as assessed by the
researchers) that was achieved, according to the most relevant indices
(see Table 1). Section 5 presents a more detailed account of some key
ﬁndings in relation to scenario planning as Communicative Action
arranged according to Habermas' triad; process, procedure and product
(see Section 5.1).
Table 2
Consideration of scenario workshops and approximation to ideal speech situations; text in italic (column 3) indicates process divergence from ideal speech.
Activities Activity description Ideal speech situation — insights from indices
(1) Participant recruitment
(pre workshop)
Selection including convenience sampling and utilising existing researchers' networks. Opportunity for participants to identify perspectives that were absent was provided (increasing
inclusivity). Emphasis on ‘expert’ and institutional actors (rather than practitioners). Potential for
participant strategizing through self-selection in ﬁnal attendance.
(2) Identifying drivers
(pre workshop)
Pre-preparation of drivers/sheep ‘timeline’ by project team. Pre-selection of industry ‘drivers’ by researchers had potential to inﬂuence ﬁnal selection of drivers in
the workshop.
(3) Introduction to scenario
planning method and
principles
(workshop events)
Introduction to EPIC project, team and individual participants; participant grouping according to
workshop seating plan.
Open introductions (to each other and to method) are inclusive; ‘laying cards on table’, etc.
‘Strategic’ positioning of project members according to seating plan and spatial arrangements may be
considered power balancing (intended) or deceptive (unintended). Power balancing by researchers to
facilitate group activities (i.e. domination by powerful interests/personalities minimised) can also be
an exercise of power by researchers over participants.
Deﬁned rules of engagement as ‘Chatham House Rules’ (i.e.; individuals and afﬁliations not associated
with any comments in proceedings) – no audio recording permitted.
Chatham House Rules removes constraints on free speech, as well as inclusive, equal, no force
other than better argument; promotes need for validity claims.
Anonymity masks contributor's interests: strategic interest can appear as consensus.
Presentation of workshop outline and expectations. Absence of deception in terms of explicit statement of objectives.
Research project remit required research-led agenda, which may be considered unequal and
potentially strategic.
(4) Ranking of drivers by
impact
(workshop event)
Exercise explanation Absence of deception in terms of explicit statement of objectives.
Tension between openness/structured process and power of researchers versus other participants.
‘Dynamic’ plenary to discuss ranking of impact drivers. Inclusive and promotes need for validity claims; promotes development of universal argument
(i.e. agree level of impact of each driver). Participants were given the opportunity to add drivers to
the pre-selected list. A number of drivers were added.
Anonymity can mask contributor's interests and strategic interest can appear as consensus.
Facilitated ranking exercise. Parcelled, timed release of information regarding workshop exercise by the facilitators increased
efﬁciency but reduces transparency and maintains power balance in favour of facilitators/researchers.
‘Reﬂective’ plenary to ﬁnalise ranking. Inclusive; reﬂective (permitting ‘hypothetical attitudes’).
(5) Ranking of drivers by
uncertainty
‘Dynamic’ plenary to discuss ranking of impact drivers Inclusive; relies on validated argument to process discussion (i.e. to combine the drivers – reach
consensus).
Driver pre-selection by researchers may have inﬂuenced ﬁnal workshop selection.
(6) Selection of axes Facilitated discussion of potential scenarios based on axes determined by critical uncertainties Pragmatic facilitation (based on previous workshop experience) limited freedom from domination and
controlled selection of axes and scenario nodes (i.e. whether or not an axis represented a critical uncertainty).
(7) Generating scenario
narratives/storylines
Small group discussion based on presentation of method, goal of axes, generation of scenario titles, stylised
representation and timeline.
Promotes intention to convince universal audience; also seeks to make knowledge explicit (what we
know about the method, the drivers, axes, etc.).
(8) Closing plenary
(workshop activity)
Description of interim and second workshop activities, including review of participation (i.e.
representation of interests).
Opportunity for participants to identify perspectives that were absent was provided (therefore
increasing inclusivity). Continuation of an open and respectful environment.
(9) Interim activities Project team adds scientiﬁc detail and validation to scenario narratives Participants less able to promote intersubjective validity claims. Intention of researchers to validate scenario
narratives may be considered to balance power in favour of researcher (and scientiﬁc knowledge).
Scenario narratives document distributed to participants and validation sought about accuracy
(reﬂecting the workshop discussion), plausibility and internal coherence
Making implicit theoretical knowledge explicit and opportunity for ‘criticism and reply’ (rationally
motivated agreement). Scenario narratives conﬁrmed with participants at second workshop.
In practice the method did not result in signiﬁcant interaction between workshops (limited inclusivity).
(10) Presentation of
scenario narratives
(workshop activity)
Review of scenario narratives generated in ﬁrst workshop including development of fourth scenario
narrative
Promotes intention to convince universal audience; also seeks to make knowledge explicit, and
allows criticism and reply. Revisiting scenario space identiﬁed by participants at close of ﬁrst
workshop. Inclusive element to agree fourth scenario.
(11) Scenario
analysis/testing
(workshop activity)
Group exercises designed to challenge and reﬁne scenario narratives, including exercise in which
participants invented scenario relevant newspaper headlines.
Exercises have potential to promote universal arguments through intersubjective validity claims.
Group exercises designed to consider implications of each scenario (‘shock’ and strategy development
exercises'.
Group discussions, where power is equal, promote greater opportunities for individuals to voice
their views and make validity claims.
Potential for researcher-led process to be unequal (i.e. in terms of representation of views).
Group ‘wind-tunnelling’ exercise; 2–3 strategies from each subgroup discussed in plenary. Allows authority based on ‘good argument’ and for criticism and reply, in discussion process (i.e.
to agree effects of measures on scenarios).
(12) Participant evaluation
(post workshop)
Feedback survey distributed to participants to capture participant evaluation of workshop process and
experience.
Opportunity for criticism and reply. Acts to equalise power balance between participants and
facilitators/research team.
Pre-deﬁned survey questionnaire prone to shape responses to expectations and can be unequal.
(13) Reporting and
dissemination
(post workshop)
Reports written by researchers primarily for Scottish Government and the stakeholders who had
participated, but publicly available on the EPIC website http://epicscotland.org/ and academic outputs
(including the current paper).
Enables realization of the intent to convince a universal audience and presents the opportunity for
arguments to gain general assent.
Creates power imbalances between authors and participants. Introduces the danger of exclusivity by
enclosing arguments in a black box.
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The case study workshops were designed and executed by re-
searchers in the Scottish Government-funded Centre of Expertise on
Animal Disease Outbreaks (known as EPIC) which was, “established
with the overarching purpose of providing high quality advice and anal-
yses on the epidemiology of animal diseases that are important to Scot-
land” (EPIC Action Plan EPIC Directorate, 2012) to policy-makers from
the Animal Health and Welfare Division at the Scottish Government.
EPIC researchers, with invited participants from Scottish Government
and various stakeholders, conducted scenario planning exercises to
think strategically about future disease management in the Scottish
sheep and cattle industries (Boden et al., 2015). By following a conven-
tional set of scenario building exercises, the research team facilitated
the creation of plausible yet imaginative narratives (Shoemaker,
1995) through a series of stakeholder workshops, as outlined in Fig. 1.
The speciﬁc method in the case featured in this paper is normative sce-
nario planning, also known as exploratory scenario planning (Thomas,
2012; Chermack, 2011). Normative scenario planning (see also
Rounsevell and Metzger, 2010; Chermack and Van Der Merwe,
2003; Van Der Heijden, 2005), as used in the case study, featured a
derivative of the widely used Two Axes Method, namely, the hybrid
Three Axes Approach (Mićić, 2005 (cited Gracht, 2008, p127);
Ralston and Wilson, 2006). Given these conventional
features, lessons learned from the case study are presented as having
a useful degree of generality for participatory scenario planning
more widely.
Training was commissioned from a professional facilitator and
involved putting the researchers through a simulated scenario
building process. The trainer was subsequently retained to assist
with the facilitation of a series of workshops bringing direct ex-
perience of Foresight (Government Ofﬁce for Science, 2013) and
other completed scenario planning projects. Two workshops
were held, each comprising two days of scenario planning with
stakeholders. One workshop in 2013 explored the future of the
Scottish cattle industry. The second workshop considered the fu-
ture of the Scottish sheep industry and was held in 2014. In both
cases the two-day workshops were not run on consecutive days
but separated by several weeks to allow the researchers to con-
duct interim analyses. The future time horizon for both industries
was 2040; a timeframe jointly agreed by the researchers and pol-
icy contacts from Scottish Government. The workshop facilitation
was conducted by an interdisciplinary team comprising of two
social scientists, three veterinary epidemiologists and the experi-
enced trainer, supported by other researchers operating as
scribes and assisting with presentational, operational and admin-
istrative tasks. Participants included representatives from the
Scottish sheep and cattle sectors, wider farming representatives,
those with interests in land use, wildlife conservation and forest-
ry, the Scottish Centres of Expertise on water (CREW) and cli-
mate change (CXC), economists, agricultural and social
scientists, veterinarians, epidemiologists, EPIC scientists and
Scottish Government ofﬁcials. Participants were given the role
of scenario planners, tasked with engaging in strategic thinking
through a series of conventional scenario planning exercises
that resulted in the creation of four scenarios set in 2040. The
focal question addressed was: What will the Scottish sheep/cattle
industry look like in 2040 and how resilient will it be to livestock
disease? (EPIC, 2014; EPIC, 2015) The question owed its form to
the twin concerns of encouraging the development of radically dif-
ferent farming future scenarios incorporating socio-cultural, technolog-
ical, economical environmental and political elements (STEEP (see also
Political, Economic, Social and Technological with the acronym PEST))
in order to transcend current thinking but at the same time to limit
the scope of the exercise to factors considered relevant to the control
of livestock disease in Scotland.The workshop discussions and resulting scenarios formed the basis
for interim reports distributed between workshop events, and ﬁnal
reports written for a policy/non-academic audience (EPIC, 2014; EPIC,
2015). Following each workshop event, participants completed a short
evaluation questionnaire; the results of which were incorporated into
future workshop planning and processes of researcher co-reﬂection,
reported in the following section. Rich narratives and interesting strate-
gic ideas were obtained and both are described in detail in Boden et al.
(2015). The current paper will not cover the same ground but rather, as
has been set out, will critique the organization and execution of the ex-
ercise in terms of its generalizable characteristics according to the ideal
speech indices in Table 1.
4.3. Case study analysis
The data were analysed qualitatively to consider the ways in which
the scenario planning case had approximated ideal speech using tech-
niques of content analysis (for example Krippendorff, 2013) and reﬂec-
tive commentary. A matrix was constructed (Table 2) in order to
present the results, where Columns 1 and 2 represent the different
phases of the process in chronological order and Column 3 includes
subjective assessments of the key issues under investigation, namely
whether and how the activity successfully approximated ideal speech
(considering the indices presented in Table 1). The data used to support
the completion of the matrix comprised the EPIC workshop process
design (see Fig. 1), project materials including reports, scribes' notes
and project team comments. An analytical approach, which is explicitly
qualitative, has been followed to stimulate a discussion about the corre-
spondences and divergences between an extant theory and an example
of practice.
5. Results
5.1. Habermas' analytic viewpoints
This section deals in some detail with what are identiﬁed as
the most signiﬁcant items recorded in Table 2. The presentation
of results follows Habermas in deploying three lenses to consider
the speciﬁcs of the stakeholder engagement: process, procedure,
and product (see Fig. 2). Developing the concept of ideal speech
situations Habermas delineates these three viewpoints on argu-
mentative speech which we further develop to organize our ﬁnd-
ings in this section. The “three aspects” (Habermas, 1984a:25) do
not directly map onto the indices in Table 1, nor do they neces-
sarily relate to one passage of the scenario planning exercise.
The perspectives cut across both and serve to draw-out particular
challenges to legitimacy by looking at the whole from different
angles as they form separate analytic resources for interpreting
discourse.
Firstly, Habermas considers argumentation as a process governed by
pragmatic presuppositions on the part of every competent speaker.
These presuppositions are prerequisites to enter into argumentation.
For Habermas, actors must presuppose that reaching a rational
understanding excludes all force, both internal and external, from
the argumentation process, apart from the force of better arguments.
A useful metaphor Habermas invokes is that argumentation in which
reasons for accepting or rejecting claims are advanced cannot avoid
using ‘the voice of reason’ which presupposes the wider emancipatory
project (Habermas, 1991). Furthermore, all motives, beyond the motiva-
tion to cooperatively seek truth, are ideally excluded. He also refers to
this process of argumentation, when it is approximating ‘ideal speech’ as
“reﬂexive continuation”, whereby actors cooperate in good faith free
from constraints, (Habermas, 1984a: 25).
Secondly, Habermas critically views argumentation as a procedure
subject to special rules whereby normative regulation operates to
allow disputants to adopt hypothetical attitudes. For this to succeed,
Fig. 1. Scenario planning process.
144 D.G. Duckett et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 114 (2017) 138–151disputantsmust be relieved of practical pressures, freed from relying on
their experiences and allowed the space to use tests of reason only, to
assess the claims of their opponents.
Thirdly, Habermas sees argumentation as a vehicle for producing
cogent arguments (or products) that have the power to convince (by
force of argument) dependent on inherent validity claims that can be
refuted (or upheld). These claims are supported by intrinsic components
which Habermas further subdivides into: grounds (or reasons) throughFig. 2. Trinocular framework: Three critical lenses to evaluatewhich claims are established; rules or warrants through which grounds
are obtained; and backing from evidence of various kinds which support
the grounds and the rules. This perspective (product) reveals the
underlying components of individual arguments and how they are
interrelated. In doing so it allows insight into how validity claims
are grounded in arguments.
Explaining his triadic approach, Habermas draws a parallel
between his three distinguishing aspects and the Aristotelianthe approximation of ideal speech in scenario planning.
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and logic with product. He proposes that this formal division,
which grounds his approach in the philosophical tradition, re-
veals different facets of argumentation. These abstractions serve
to allow a nuanced understanding of different elements of
Habermas' theory and we adopt them as an organizing frame-
work to similarly facilitate a nuanced reading of the case study
in this section. It must be emphasised that Habermas is explicit
in stressing that these three lenses are not discreet categories
whereby discourse can be sorted into separate components, but
that they are alternate ways of analysing discourse. Correspond-
ingly, there is no strict division between episodes that were
enacted in the course of the exercise and the three perspectives
Habermas distinguishes. Each one of the three modes can be ap-
plied to each stage of the public deliberation. Process, which
Habermas discusses in relation to rhetoric, concerns the form of
an argument rather than its content. In particular, the person
practiced in the technique of rhetoric employs a set of processes
to persuade an audience without necessarily holding a corre-
sponding belief in what is being said (Foucault, 2011). Looking
through the lens of process one therefore seeks to analyse the in-
dividual deployment of speech through which attempts to exert
inﬂuence are exercised. To look at process, in other words, is to
consider the strategies, techniques and overall form with which
knowledge claims are advanced. Procedure also relates to form
rather than content, and hence there is a degree of overlap in
the following analysis, however procedure captures the idea of
exploring the coherence of the discursive system that allows us
to determine good and bad forms of reasoning. For our purposes
this entails an investigation of the normative, regulative struc-
ture of the scenario planning exercise in which we want to pro-
mote ideal speech. For example, exploring the basis by which
researchers exert control as they direct different activities.
Finally product is a lens through which we aim to evaluate the content
produced by the process and the procedure in terms of its association
to evidence or other authority. The expertise, for example, supporting
a particular claim, may be an important factor, or ‘ground’ (Habermas,
1984a) in its argumentative force or validity, particularly when it
comes to persuading a universal audience, therefore a link may need
to be explicit for ideal speech to be better approximated. It is therefore
through this rather formal triadic framework, based on Habermas
(1984a) thatwe seek to identify differentways inwhich the EPIC scenario
planning approximated or fell signiﬁcantly short of ideal speech.
5.2. Process
It may be useful to consider the process lens as one focused on the
unit of analysis of an individual participant attempting to advance
claims in order to shape outcomes of the discursive activity. At this
level there are preconditions necessary to enter into an argumentation
in the ﬁrst place (Habermas, 1984a: 25). Individuals hold worldviews.
These are an unavoidable condition of participatory scenario planning
that the researcher cannot control (O'Brien, 2004) and that condition
the speaker's rhetorical repertoire. The planner is not completely
powerless however. At the planning and recruitment stage (see Table 2,
Activity 1), there is theoretical scope to ensure the inclusion of a wide
range of worldviews by considering individual socio-economic circum-
stances and political afﬁliations.
Habermas' ideal is to include all those who are affected by de-
cisions that may emerge, directly or indirectly, from the process
(Table 1. Index 8). In Habermasian terms, the detachment of
those affected from decision inﬂuencing processes is conceived
as contributory to ‘the uncoupling of the system from the life-
world’ (Habermas, 1984b: 187), a generally undesirable outcome
in which human freedom is unnecessarily limited by
social structure. Alcamo et al. (2006) offer the same direction tominimize partisan strategizing by being more expansive in
terms of inclusion. Against this, the participatory opportunity in
any scenario planning process is necessarily limited in several
ways. First, researchers are subject to resource constraints that
limit both the number of external interests being invited to par-
ticipate and the temporal extent of any engagement. From the
outset these constraints are anathema to the ideal speech
situation (see Table 1.). Inclusion in the decision-making process
of those potentially affected by decisions constitutes a normative
value associated with fairness (Rowe and Frewer, 2000;
Horlick-Jones et al., 2007). Temporal limitations, which operate
at the individual (process) and more general (procedure) level,
further constrain the opportunity for rational argument; a com-
modity that ideally ought not to be a rationed, ﬁnite resource,
but should be sufﬁcient for the task in hand (Horlick-Jones
et al., 2007). In Table 1. Indices 7 and 8 describe the ideal re-
quirements that may be compromised.
Second, owing to resource limitations, potential participants are
evaluated and selected on the basis of overt or implied criteria (e.g.
the ability to represent a particular knowledge in the scenario process,
such as speaking credibly on behalf of a group of individuals or body
of scientiﬁc knowledge). These selection criteria represent the potential
to privilege certain types of knowledge (e.g. scientiﬁc over experiential
or professional over practical). The expectations of the funder for
the scenario process may also inﬂuence participant selection (e.g.
emphasising the selection of ‘experts’). It is important to note that there
is no inherent reason why scenario planning should not be undertaken
exclusively by experts, however, in such cases the process might better
be regarded as expert elicitation or some other form of consultancy and
not participatory in the sense discussed here (see also Blackstock et al.,
2015; Kishita et al., 2016). Index4 (egalitarian) speaks to the precondition
of fairly based initial recruitment.
Third, potential participants in scenario processes are limited
by their own individual resource constraints (e.g. the time and
skills necessary to participate in these types of exercises), as
well as the immediacy of the topic of scenario planning to their
personal and professional interests. There is therefore a degree
of self-selection in terms of potential participant willingness
and availability to participate in scenario processes. In the cur-
rent case study, the original speciﬁcation from the project plan
had been to assemble key informants and stakeholders with fur-
ther reference made to ‘a panel of experts’. In the early stages of
planning the research a collaborative exercise in stakeholder
analysis was undertaken, which systematically identiﬁed the
areas of interest (rather than speciﬁc individuals) that the re-
searchers considered appropriate to invite to the workshops.
The interpretation of the research brief by the researchers result-
ed in invitations to institutional representatives and profes-
sionals (for example veterinarians); potential participants were
identiﬁed and approached on the basis of their ability to fulﬁl
the established criteria (see Table 2, Activity 1). Inevitably, a
number of invitations were declined. Researchers then drew on
their professional networks to recruit a predetermined number
of participants, utilising personal connections to overcome bar-
riers to participation (McKee et al., 2015), albeit within the pa-
rameters of the roles that had been identiﬁed. Certain groups
proved more difﬁcult to recruit than others. For example, only
one representative from the retail sector was successfully re-
cruited for the sheep workshop, and none for the cattle work-
shop. The result was that participants mainly comprised
representatives of organisations, professionals (for example vet-
erinarians), other researchers and ofﬁcials. One consequence of
this self-selection was, to some extent, the participation of ‘the
usual suspects’ (Lee and Abbot, 2003), the effect of which is po-
tentially far reaching and difﬁcult to control for despite extra ef-
forts that were made to recruit from groups that initially
1 Axes are treated by the methodology as critical uncertainties that are more important
than others being most likely to deﬁne the way the future will unfold around the focal is-
sue (Garvin and Levesque, 2005).
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which index 7 can be satisﬁed.
One technique adopted to broaden participation was to provide the
participants with an opportunity, in the workshop structure, to identify
signiﬁcant additional perspectives that they believed were missing
(see Table 2, Activity 8). At the cattle workshop, participant feedback
highlighted that farmerswere perceived as underrepresented, suggesting
they should be directly involved instead of represented by industry
bodies. During the sheep workshop, at which researchers were able
to achieve greater farmer participation, the participants identiﬁed con-
sumers and retailers as underrepresented groups. One challenge of inte-
grating these groups into the workshop structure of the participatory
scenario process is in enabling integration of the different types of
expertise and knowledge these groups are likely to bring. For example,
policy professionals and organisational representatives are typically
more experienced and therefore conﬁdent in participating in workshop-
type environments (Pinto-Correia et al., 2015). Consumer groups and
retailers are less likely to engage in processes which appear distant from
their primary interests. Participation of these more peripherally engaged
or differently skilled groups may thus be limited by self-selection, rather
than researcher intent. Reﬂecting on the scope of the engagement, the
researchers considered that additional validation of outcomes might be
attained via future work with a broader group of stakeholders (see also
Alcamo et al. (2006) and discussed holding activities at both public events
(for example agricultural shows) and at schools.
Another practical way to deal with any imbalance is for the re-
searchers to be transparent regarding participant recruitment strat-
egies, and to ensure that any claims that they make about inclusivity
regarding the scenario planning exercise are carefully considered,
following Habermas' presupposition that truthfulness is integral to
ideal speech (1984b). Further analyses of who is willing to participate
and how power and exclusion operate to shape process outcomes
would also add to the validity of similar exercises (Lee and Abbot,
2003).
5.3. Procedure
To delineate the lens of procedure from those of process and
product it can be considered as relating more to the way in
which the discursive interactions (here our stakeholder work-
shops) are normatively regulated. As with the logistics determin-
ing the composition of participation (considered above as
process), workshop exercises are similarly subject to practical-
ities over which the organizers of the scenario exercises, in this
case the researchers, inevitably hold power to structure and de-
ﬁne the nature of interactions. The facilitated exercises were, in
theory, intended to free the participants from the ordinary con-
straints of their immediate environment and individual interests
by enabling them to engage collaboratively in creative scenario
building, with no proposal off-limits and imagination explicitly
encouraged. There was, in Habermasian terms, an intention
from researchers to create the conditions for a hypothetical atti-
tude to ﬂourish (Habermas, 1984a) and for participants to bring
only reasons to bear on each other's claims (see Table 1. Indices
5 and 6). However before these ideally ‘unfettered’ tasks (De
Brabandere and Iny, 2010: 1508) were undertaken the broad out-
lines or building blocks of the scenarios were shaped by the
researchers including the pre-selection of a set of drivers (see
Table 2, Activity 2), which were used to form the axes and under-
pin the general dynamics of the scenarios (Gracht, 2008; Ralston
and Wilson, 2006). Notwithstanding the potential for ideal
speech patterns in plenary exercises in which the stakeholders
ranked, chose and were encouraged to add to the list of drivers
initially presented to them, the ‘three axes’ method adopted to
structure the scenario generation involved the researchers over-
seeing the selection process which led to the formation of thethree scenario axes1 required by the method (see Table 2, Activ-
ity 6). These interventions were justiﬁed to participants by the
researchers on pragmatic grounds, guided by the most experi-
enced trainer's prior experience about what would constitute a
workable set of axes and what would lead to completion of the
exercise in a timely fashion (both important considerations). Al-
though the axes selected were generally in line with the
expressed preferences of the participants, in one instance, a po-
tential choice for one of the axes proposed by the participants
in the sheep workshop, was rejected by the researchers on the
grounds that it had the wrong properties to be an effective axis.
The resultant scenarios therefore were not developed around
this participant proposed axis. The speciﬁc proposal in the case
study was ‘climate change’, a driver that was considered in the
scenario development, but one that was not accorded the partic-
ular status of an axis.
The intervention by the researchers in the selection of axes
(on pragmatic grounds) reﬂects a power imbalance at play dur-
ing the interaction driven by the requirements of the method
for achieving outcomes set against the messy characteristics of
the visioning ﬁeld. In broad terms the facilitators can act to
shape the scenarios both through pragmatic pursuit of effective
engagement and their own assessments of the knowledge put
forward by participants, consequently inﬂuencing any reports
and recommendations that may emerge. While this clearly con-
strains ideal speech, given the inevitable time restrictions and
the unfamiliarity of the scenario process to the participants, a
certain imbalance may be unavoidable. Indeed many participato-
ry research and other workshop exercises, of which scenario
planning is no exception, need to balance the needs of timely
completion and production of project outputs against the con-
cern that the results are artefactual. Further challenges are intro-
duced by considering participation in simple terms as ‘human to
human interactions through the medium of language(Webler,
1995:40) for example, managing participant fatigue
(Gramberger et al., 2015). The general point is that this balancing
act, which may be pragmatically justiﬁable, is not necessarily ex-
plicit and may have a bearing on claims about the participatory
nature of outcomes that undermine legitimacy.
Another critical activity conducted in our chosen form of sce-
nario planning that can be viewed through the lens of ‘procedure’
is the development of a set of scenario narratives (see Table 2, Activity 7),
an activitywhich is a central component of themethodology (Mićić (2005
cited Gracht, 2008, p127); Ralston andWilson, 2006; Schoemaker, 1995).
This particular element potentially corresponds with ideal speech
(Table 1. Index 5) in respect of the claim made for the technique to free
scenario planners from their regular ways of thinking through a level of
abstraction inherent in the method (Schoemaker, 1995). Potentially this
imaginative space can act to reduce strategizing and political
manoeuvring. In our experience, the scenarios did appear to live up to
this expectation, often throwing up highly imaginative elements that
did not seem to be contingent upon the interests of the individuals partic-
ipating. Indeed, there seemed to be an intersubjective space created
where the intentionwas to create stories that would convince a universal
audience or gain general assent (see Table 1. Index2). Nonetheless, the fa-
cilitation of narrative generation appears ill-equipped to either recognise
ormitigate for participants determined upon ‘gaming’ the process, partic-
ularly anyonewith prior knowledge of themethod intent on representing
a particular interest. In other words, participants with a strategic interest
in telling a particular future story had an opportunity to do so. In
Habermas' terms, strategic action could potentially compete with Com-
municative Action, although there is no evidence of any such activity in
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tunity for participant strategizing bywithholding information, releasing it
stage-by-stage and thereby restricting the time available for strategic ac-
tion. There was certainly an element of this present in the case study as
the logic of particular elements, for example ‘windtunnelling’ was
explained only immediately prior to the exercise (see Table 2, Activity
11). However, the down-side of trying to out-manoeuvre participants
are two-fold; ﬁrstly that the researchers can underestimate the partici-
pants who may already know about the intricacies of scenario planning
or may ‘catch-on’ quickly; secondly, allowing the facilitators the upper
hand is no closer to the ideal, potentially shaping outcomes in an
unequal way lacking legitimacy and jeopardizing Indices 1 and 3 (see
Table 1.).
5.4. Product
Product is adopted as a conceptual lens to focus on the arguments or
claims that emerged from the scenario planning exercises in the form of
reports and communications intended for the consumption of Scottish
Government policy teams, and that present a signiﬁcant challenge
from an ideal speech perspective (see Table 2, Activity 13). A major
issue concerns the tendency for the claims arising from the exercises
to become detached from supporting evidence and from any warrants
that were originally associated with the force that accompanied their
production. In Habermasian terms the backing for a claim (which is
part of the structure of argumentation and can be made up of different
kinds of evidence) needs to be associated with a “problematic utter-
ance” to establish the validity of the claim (Habermas, 1984a:25). This
detachment is manifest in unsupported claims being present in the sce-
nario narratives, which are in turn present in reports and outputs. In
other words, there is a reiﬁcation of claims present in the scenario nar-
ratives whereby recommendations appear to have emerged from a
‘black box’, with no effective mechanism for establishing who made
them and weak reporting of how they were justiﬁed at the time. It is
therefore possible for the perspectives of dominant participants (or
the facilitators) to feature more strongly in the development of strate-
gies, contrary to the democratic objective of ideal speech (Table 1. par-
ticularly Indices 1 and 4) and for this inﬂuence to be unacknowledged in
outputs.
For example, the scenario narratives themselves and the sur-
rounding exercises resulted in the development of a number of
suggested strategies that purported to promote resilience in both
the cattle and sheep industries in Scotland (see Table 2, Activities
10 and 11). One key aspect of that development however, was
that the recommendations emerging from the process are not at-
tributable to the individuals who argued for them, because of an
earlier process decision taken to grant anonymity through ‘Chat-
ham House Rules’2 (see Table 2, Activity 3). Within the workshop
this convention for maintaining anonymity aimed to lift
constraints by allowing the participants to speak candidly ‘off the
record’ and to think beyond the established positions of their re-
spective institutions without fear of sanction. However, in terms
of universality and transparency, something that ideal speech situ-
ations intend to foster, this provision operates to mask the identi-
ties of the individuals who propose and reﬁne the emergent
strategies. There is a resulting opportunity for, ‘strategic action’
(Habermas, 1984b: 86) for example, when one interest group pro-
poses measures that could hypothetically affect another interest
group not represented at the table. In the case study there was an
instance when changes to the school curriculum were proposed,
in order to make epidemiology a core subject for school children.2 This is a convention established to ensure a level of conﬁdentiality. Meetings held un-
der the Chatham House Rule allow participants to freely use information received under
the provision that neither the identity nor the afﬁliation of any other participant may be
revealed outside the conﬁnes of the meeting.This strategic response to challenges in one of the future scenarios
arose in a small group exercise where no representatives of the ed-
ucational system were present. Another strategic proposal was the
establishment of an international laboratory in Scotland to under-
take research into livestock disease control. While it is known
that researchers were at the table where this strategy was pro-
posed, the anonymity protocol agreed at the outset precludes re-
vealing the degrees to which this strategy was pursued or
developed by those with a direct interest in research, industry or
policy. The general point is that the presence or absence of vested
interests inﬂuences outcomes (O'Brien, 2004; Rounsevell and
Metzger, 2010; Wright et al., 2009). Subtle inﬂuences can become
reiﬁed in recommendations, claims or agendas derived from sce-
nario processes, emerging either implicitly or explicitly, packaged
as scientiﬁc ﬁndings.
To summarise, the inability to attribute any of the measures
proposed in the case study's outputs to any of the participants
falls short of the transparency demanded of ideal speech, particu-
larly given that the intended audience is policy makers in the pub-
lic sphere. Against this, freeing participants from their outside
obligations, which may include pressures to act strategically, is
something that ideal speech encourages.
6. Discussion
At this point, it is important to reiterate that the ideal speech
standard as applied to the case study is explicitly an ideal and not
a test to be passed or failed. Various commentators have critically
noted that ideal speech is unattainable (Leeuwis, 2000;
Allmendinger, 2009; Taylor, 2010; Fast, 2013; McKee et al., 2015).
Indeed, Habermas himself allows that the ‘ideal speech situation’
cannot be achieved given the role of outside forces, the challenges
of ensuring that those communicating are ‘equal partners’ (see
Allmendinger, 2009), and that strategic considerations do not
override commitments to participation. Research projects, by
their nature, are often predicated on predeﬁned objectives; a
remit bias generally exists in having to deliver to a speciﬁc
timeframe and to a customer, which challenges the Habermasian
ideal. Power relations, such as the power to exclude, are displayed
and reinforced both in research and throughout the public sphere.
As Berger and Luckmann (1967): 109) observe: “He who has the
bigger stick has the better chance of imposing his deﬁnitions of re-
ality” (see also Taylor, 2010) and interest groups often pursue their
particular interests highly successfully. Indeed this recognition of
‘far from ideal’ reality is in fact what drives the whole Habermasian
theory of democracy. Habermas argues that what underpins delib-
erative processes is the presupposition of particular universal
norms, despite the failure of argumentation in a whole array of so-
cial contexts including scenario planning. It is the presupposition
by citizens engaged in the deliberative process that the general
norms, represented here in the indices (see Table 1.), ought to be
those that govern democratic deliberation, ceterus paribus, that
motivates further attempts at Communicative Action (Olson,
2011). Furthermore, it is self-evident that the presumptively
valid general norms cannot always be realized, because they them-
selves are not practicable in all circumstances. Human enterprises,
including deliberative processes, are constrained by resources in
ways that impact democratic freedoms. Here, Habermas invokes a
‘principle of appropriateness` (Rehg, 2011). This principle rests
counterfactually on the notion that those affected could accept
the appropriateness of the proposition given that those who actu-
ally took part in the discourse did so free from coercion, having
judged the matter on its merits and in possession of the necessary
information.
Therefore, this paper has set out to a way of thinking about the
legitimacy of a method that we acknowledge to be already useful
148 D.G. Duckett et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 114 (2017) 138–151(cf. Rounsevell and Metzger, 2010), not to propose infeasible con-
ditions. The utility of bringing the Habermasian framework into
the scenario planning domain lies in promoting the adoption of a
particular mind-set through which better processes can be
enacted. Clearly, critical researchers already question the assump-
tions that they make when designing processes, and many if not all
the challenges identiﬁed above are not new to seasoned practi-
tioners however, what the introduction of Habermasian theory
brings is a conceptual framework through which the various chal-
lenges can be thought of in an holistic and systematic way.
For the case study presented, a degree of success can be claimed
for its execution as a participatory research project. For example,
the participants appeared to have been challenged and enlightened
by one another's perspectives; an assessment supported by the
participant's feedback responses. In addition, social learning ap-
pears to have been enabled, not least through the creation of new
relationships, the development of understanding built on trust-
worthiness, and an appreciation, indicated by participants in their
feedback, of other legitimate viewpoints (Reed et al., 2010). With
regard to research outcomes, the researchers can also claim, for ex-
ample, that the participants drawn into the process increased the
knowledge-base available to EPIC, that useful inputs were obtained
from a range of stakeholders that contributed to more realistic
epidemiological models being developed, and that new networks
and collaborations were encouraged by assembling the
chosen stakeholders. These positive research outcomes were the
result of the application of a conventional qualitative scenario
methodology (Schoemaker, 1995). However, these achievements,
whilst welcomed from a general research perspective are not sufﬁ-
cient to be considered Communicative Action, nor can they ensure
that the outcomes generated are free from what Habermas con-
ceives as Strategic Action (1984b). Habermas is concerned that
various constraints can act to allow the promotion of certain inter-
ests at the expense of others and he is proposing emancipatory
approaches that lead to more democratic decision-making. As
such he is keen to distinguish between participation that
encourages debate freed from unnecessary constraint, based
more ﬁrmly on reason and other, less emancipatory forms where
participants may well challenge one another and even learn some-
thing, but where their arguments are strategic. Our reﬂection on
this particular case suggests that determinations regarding which
engagements resemble Communicative Action and which appear
closer to strategic action are by no means straightforward. In
order to present some of the issues it is possible to identify two dis-
tinct ways in which the indices in Table 1 can guide the scenario
planner.
The ﬁrst insight that ideal speech allows is where a comparison
between the indices in Table 1 and a real-world participatory sce-
nario planning exercise indicates a challenge to legitimacy (i.e.
the underlying assumption being that approximating an ideal
speech situation offers greater legitimacy for participatory exer-
cises in the public sphere). Aspects of the engagement in the sce-
nario planning case under review, for example, appear to
approximate ideal speech in certain respects and diverge from it
in others, as the preceding analysis has shown. These binary oppo-
sitions are sometimes a challenge, however they can present a clear
opportunity for process improvement even if that simply amounts
to being more explicit about process constraints (for example, ac-
knowledging howmuch time was allowed for particular activities).
The logic of the proposed approach is that the utility of the scenario
planning process can be improved by managing known dynamics
effectively. At the simplest level this means maximising the degree
to which approximation to ideal speech can be achieved,
minimising elements that appear to poorly approximate the ideal,
and where reconciliation is problematic, being explicit about the
shortcomings. The controlling inﬂuence of the researchers in theselection of axes provides a useful example of the issues involved
in managing these dynamics. While the researchers' power to in-
tervene and shape many aspects of an engagement limits the egal-
itarian basis upon which argumentation ought to be founded for
ideal speech (see Table 1, Index 4), there can be pragmatic justiﬁca-
tions especially during complex steps in the scenario process.
These operational challenges can be recorded, made explicit in out-
puts to enhance the participatory credentials of scenario planning.
Process improvement for future axes selection exercises may
include providing additional information to participants and
timetabling more time for this activity. The general
principle, across all aspects of scenario planning in the public
sphere, is that the facilitators (in our cases, researchers) are vigi-
lant regarding unnecessary constraints and committed to reducing
them where possible. The methodological challenges to using this
principle to improve processes are signiﬁcant with pragmatism re-
peatedly interrupting the pursuit of ideals and demanding a high
level of sensitivity on the part of the researcher. While these may
not be easy skills to acquire (McKee et al., 2015) the general princi-
ples are usually straightforward.
The second way in which ideal speech can guide participatory
engagement is more complex and not simply a matter of
weighing binary oppositions. When considered holistically, par-
ticular elements can be quite reasonably evaluated both positive-
ly and negatively against the ideal speech benchmark. An
example of this ambivalence is the question of participant ano-
nymity under Chatham House rules. While this provision may
have had the intended effect of enabling the participants to
express their views without the fear of organisational censure
from their respective employers, it was a double-edged sword
when it came to presenting participant views to a universal audi-
ence from whom possible self-interest (on the part of both the
scenario planners and the researchers) was effectively concealed.
In such cases the solution must lie in making a determination
about which constraints on ideal speech are more detrimental
to the objective of the engagement. In certain contexts a failure
to guarantee anonymity might jeopardize any useful contribu-
tions with participants not willing to expose themselves to insti-
tutional reprimand or under an obligation to refrain from
criticism of certain kinds. A whole range of political, legal, medi-
cal and other situations may require participants to be able to
speak ‘off the record’ in order to facilitate generation of any use-
ful scenarios. Nevertheless, the decision to proceed with some
level of anonymity may impose a limitation, not only on the
transparency of the outcomes but on the overall legitimacy of
the exercise. When these signiﬁcant determinations are made
we contend that it may be useful to consider all eight indices
and how any of them can be accommodated into the scenario
planning in any of the activities represented in Table 2. When
none or few of the indices seem appropriate in the process we
would argue that the engagement does not lay within the partic-
ipatory paradigm described in our introduction but may be better
described as some form of expert elicitation. However, there are
clearly matters where participation is considered useful or even
essential and it is important to emphasise the inherent danger
that Habermas places on this separation between institutional-
ized, systematized inﬂuences and the broader lifeworld in
which human action occurs. For him the democratic governance
of society itself is at stake (Habermas, 1976).
7. Conclusion
Habermas highlights the special demands incumbent on the
state to foster rational argumentation in the public sphere as the
basis of democratic governance. His particular contribution in the
context of scenario planning is to map the conditions under
149D.G. Duckett et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 114 (2017) 138–151which claims and counter claims can be rationalised and freed from
unnecessary constraints which is something that the technique
also aspires to. In particular, when participatory stakeholder en-
gagement is brought into the policy development arena it demands
the highest level of accountability, absent in parallel exercises con-
ducted in the corporate world, and it is therefore under a special
obligation to be self-critical. While critical reﬂection on scenario
planning is not new, Habermas provides a systematic and
detailed account of discursive practices in the public sphere that al-
lows a comprehensive exploration of the challenges within a
broader social theory.
We have articulated a number of speciﬁc challenges through a
case study and have shown how scenario planning exercises are so-
cial artefacts that necessarily frame the data they generate in par-
ticular ways. Habermas' theory has been applied to investigate
the extent to which scenario planning processes can transcend
methodological challenges and legitimately contribute to the pub-
lic sphere through approximating ‘ideal speech situations’. This ap-
proach does not provide the practitioner with a blueprint for the
perfect participatory scenario planning process; however, it does
help in the systematic identiﬁcation of the various problems asso-
ciated with legitimacy in this context. Habermas' shows us where
the problem areas are and perhaps crucially, how they are linked
together, and that knowledge can improve scenario planning in
the public sphere. A key strength of a Habermasian approach is
that the democratic principles underlying ‘ideal speech’ are gener-
ally enshrined in shared social values. An open and critical attitude
on the part of the researchers guided by Habermasian principles
will not only improve the legitimacy of the outcomes but will fur-
ther encourage reﬂection on the method and reduce any
artefactual issues that may otherwise be obscured by the appear-
ance of a neutral, objective methodology. More widely, cultural and
epistemological assumptions about the nature of scientiﬁc enquiry
will continue to limit the effectiveness of public engagement exercises,
but progress can be made toward developing scenario planning follow-
ing the critical approach discussed here.
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